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Due to his significant role in the development of computer technology and 
the discipline of artificial intelligence, Alan Turing has supposedly 
subscribed to the theory of mind that has been greatly inspired by the power 
of the said technology which has eventually become the dominant framework 
for current researches in artificial intelligence and cognitive science, 
namely, computationalism  or the computational theory of mind . In this essay, 
I challenge this supposition. In particular, I will try to show tha t there is no 
evidence in Turing’s two seminal works that supports such a supposition. His 
1936 paper is all about the notion of computation or computability as it 
applies to mathematical functions and not to the nature or workings of 
intelligence. On the other hand, while his 1950 work is about intelligence, it 
is, however, particularly concerned with the problem of whether intelligence 
can be attributed to computing machines and not of whether computationality 





As Alan Turing [1912-1954] played a significant role in the development of 
computer technology and the discipline of artificial intelligence (henceforth AI), it is 
natural to suppose that he subscribed to the theory of mind that has been greatly 
inspired by the power of the said technology and that has eventually become the 
dominant framework for current researches in AI and cognitive science, namely 
computationalism or the computational theory of mind . Such a supposition can be 
gleaned, for instance, from the following remark by Herbert Simon —a pioneer of AI 
and a vigorous promoter and staunch defender of computationalism —in his essay 
“Machine as mind” (1995, 676):  
 
The materials of thought are symbols—patterns, which can be replicated 
in a great variety of materials (including neurons and chips), thereby 
enabling physical symbol systems fashioned of these materials to think. 





Simon clearly speaks here of the standard view of classical computationalism  
that human thinking is a kind of computing defined as a process of symbol 
manipulation, which, according to him, was pioneered by Turing. <50)   
This supposition can likewise be gleaned from the arguments of some critics of 
computationalism, in particular the anti -computationalist arguments of John Searle 
and Roger Penrose. Searle’s Chinese Room argument (1980, 417 -57) is a classic 
anticomputationalist argument that basically disputes the alleged computationalist 
conclusions drawn from the Turing test (referring to the imitation game introduced 
by Turing in his 1950 paper). Searle, in gist, argues that passing the Turing test is 
not a guarantee that a computing machine, which passes such as test, is “genuinely” 
intelligent—which, in Searle’s light, means that the machine is aware of what the 
symbols it manipulates represent in the world (see Mabaquiao 2012, 65 -67; 2008, 
229-30 for an elaboration of this argument).  
For his part, Penrose claims that no machine can ever simulate human 
intelligence and thus pass, even in principle, the Turing test. Penrose (1994, 64 -65) 
bases his claim on Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem , which, in general, states 
that any formal system is bound to contain  some propositions whose truth is not 
derivable from the rules of the system. Penrose, following Lukas (1961), infers from 
this theorem that the human mind is not a formal system and as such can never be a 
computer. For unlike computers, humans can transcend the rules of a formal system 
to recognize the truth of statements not derivable from the system. Given this, it 
would then be impossible for a formal system such as the computer to simulate the 
human mind. Speaking of the computationalist view as “A,” Searle’s as “B,” and his 
own as “C,” Penrose (1994, 14-15) distinguishes these views as follows:   
 
The acceptance of this kind of argument, which basically is what is 
referred to as a Turing test, is in essence what distinguishes A from B. 
According to A, any computer-controlled robot which, after sustained 
questioning, convincingly behaves as though it  possesses  consciousness, 
must be considered actually to be conscious—whereas according to B, a 
robot could perfectly well behave exactly as a conscious person might 
behave without itself actually possessing any of this mental quality. Both A 
and B would allow that a computer-controlled robot could convincingly 
behave as a conscious person does, but viewpoint C, on the other hand, would 
not even admit that a fully effective simulation of a conscious person could 
ever be achieved merely by a computer-controlled robot.  
  
Accordingly, while Searle disputes the sufficiency of the Turing test as a basis 
for attributing (genuine) intelligence to a computing machine, Penrose disputes the 
conceivability of a computing machine passing such a test (see Mabaquiao 201 1, 77-
80; 2012, 170-72). Nonetheless, Penrose, like Searle, focuses on the Turing test in 
making a case against computationalism. And this only proves that both Searle and 
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Penrose acknowledge the supposed critical role of the Turing test in establishing th e 
view of computationalism.              
In this essay, I challenge the supposition that Turing supports or advances the 
view of computationalism. In particular, I will show that there is no evidence in 
Turing’s two seminal works—“On computable numbers with an application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem” (1936) and “Computing machinery and intelligence” 
(1950)—that supports such a supposition. While his 1936 paper is all about the notion 
of computation or computability as it applies to mathematical functions and not to 
the nature of intelligence, his 1950 work—though about intelligence—is, however, 
particularly concerned with the problem of whether intelligence can be  <51) 
attributed to computing machines and not of whether computationality can be 
attributed to human intelligence or intelligence in general. I divide my discussion 
into three. I introduce in the first the central theses of computationalism. I discuss in 
the second Turing’s investigation of the meaning of computation. I tackle in the third 
Turing’s analysis of the legitimacy of attributing intelligence to computing machines.    
 
COMPUTATIONALISM: THE CENTRAL THESES  
 
In their joint article, “Foundations of cognitive science,” Herbert Simon and 
Craig Kaplan (1990, 2) define cognitive science as “the study o f intelligence and its 
computational processes in humans (and animals), in computers, and in the abstract.” 
This definition identifies the levels on which a computationalist investigation of the 
nature of intelligence is to be carried out, namely on the abstract, human (and 
animal), and machine levels. Based on these levels, we can accordingly divide the 
central claims of computationalism into a general thesis , which concerns the abstract 
level of intelligence, and two subtheses , which concern the human and machine levels 
of intelligence.  
The general thesis claims that thinking or cognition is a type of computational 
process or, as Zenon Pylyshyn (1990, 51) puts it, a species of computing . Cognition, 
here defined abstractly, does not exclusively pertain to the intelligence of a particular 
type of entities for it can in principle be instantiated by the intelligence of various 
types of entities. We can refer to this general thesis more specifically as the thesis of 
cognitive computationality . Now as the two subtheses concern the human and machine 
instantiations of this general thesis, we can respectively call them the thesis of human 
computationality and the thesis of machine intelligence . The thesis of human 
computationality claims that human cognition  is a computational process; whereas 
the thesis of machine intelligence claims that machines capable of computationally 
simulating human cognitive processes are themselves intelligent. As the machines 
capable of doing this simulation are computers, the thesis of m achine intelligence can 
thus be simplified as the claim that computers are intelligent.  
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While computationalism considers humans and machines as entities in which the 
general thesis of computationalism are instantiated, it must be noted that the same 
thesis can in principle be instantiated in any other conceivable type of entities that 
can be considered intelligent, examples of which are animals and aliens or 
extraterrestrials. For if it is true that cognition is a species of computing on the 
abstract level, then any conceivable entity that can be considered intelligent must be 
an entity whose intelligence is a species of computing. The general thesis thus 
guarantees that the intelligence of humans and machines are of the same kind, that is, 
of the same computational kind.  
The difference between human intelligence and machine intelligence is here 
regarded simply as a matter of degree or, more specifically, as a difference in degree 
of complexity or sophistication. This means that the intelligence of humans i s seen 
simply as a more complex or sophisticated type of intelligence than the one allegedly 
possessed by computers. Being so, the possible gap between human intelligence and 
machine intelligence is a contingent matter and thus in principle can be bridged.  
Furthermore, it is even conceivable that in the future machine intelligence will be 
able to surpass human intelligence [see Chalmers’s (2010) paper on singularity].  We 
are here, of course, referring not to the speed and accuracy by which humans and 
machines process information—for in these departments modern digital computers 
obviously outdo humans—but to the other aspects of intelligence where machines are 
still too slow compared to humans. Some of these aspects are identified in the  <52) 
following remarks byJames McClelland, David Rumelhart, and Geoffrey Hinton 
(1995, 305) in their joint article, “The appeal of parallel distributed processing”:  
 
What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker 
and more precise. Yet people are far better  at perceiving objects in natural 
scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving 
contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and 
carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other 
natural cognitive tasks. People are far better at learning to do these things 
more accurately and fluently through processing experience.  
 
Computationalism has also been called strong AI. This is due to the distinction 
made by Searle (1980) between strong AI and weak AI. According to Searle, weak AI  
is the view that makes the neutral (and philosophically uncontroversial) claim that 
the computer is a powerful tool for understanding how the mind works, while strong 
AI is the view that makes the bold (and philosophically controversial) claim that the 
human mind is a kind of computer or, more specifically, a kind of computer program 
implemented or run by the brain hardware. Strong AI thus looks at the mind -brain 
relation as a type of software-hardware relation, which is popularly put as “the mind 
is to software as the brain is to hardware.” Roger Schank and Peter Childers (1984, 
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43), two of strong AI’s staunch defenders, put straightforwardly in their book, The 
cognitive computer , the thesis of strong AI as follows: “Our cognitive apparatus has 
two main components: the actual brain itself (the hardware, really) and the knowledge 
or information it contains (the software).”  
Not only is computationalism the dominant framework in current AI researches 
pertaining to the construction of intelligent machines, it is likewise the dominant 
framework in current researches in the emergent discipline whose main project is to 
naturalize the mind or to assimilate it into the scientific worldview, namely, cognitive 
science. Jay Freidenberg and Gordon Silverman (2006, 2) define cognitive science as 
“the scientific interdisciplinary study of the mind.” It is scientific in that its primary 
methodology is the scientific method; and it is interdisciplinary in that it draws from 
the findings of a number of different disciplines whose common interest is the study 
of the mind. These disciplines are comprised of philosophy, artificial intelligence, 
linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology (see Gardner 1985, 6 -7). But 
though it aims to be interdisciplinary in its approach, cognitive science, in its very 
framework, remains to be computational. Freidenberg and Silverman (2006, 2 -3) 
explain:  
 
In order to really understand what cognitive science is all about we need 
to know what its theoretical perspective on the mind is. This perspective 
centers on the idea of computation, which may alternatively be called 
information processing. Cognitive scientists view the mind as an information 
processor. 
 
Speaking of how cognitive scientists understand the nature of the mind, Gardner 
(1985, 6) basically makes the same point:  
 
...there is the faith that central to any understanding of the human mind is 
the electronic computer. Not only are computers indispensable for carrying 
out studies of various sorts, but, more crucially, the computer also serves as 
the most viable model of how the human mind functions.  <53) 
 
Consequently, this limits what cognitive science draws from the findings of the 
other disciplines—only to those that will help advance the computational conception 
of the mind.  
 
 
THE NATURE OF COMPUTATION  
 
There are two key concepts in the theses of computationalism, namely 
computation and intelligence . To fully understand the claims of computationalism, 
one needs a good grasp of what these two concepts mean, or, better yet, how these 
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concepts are understood within the perspective of computationalism. Incidentally, 
these are also the two concepts that preoccupied Turing in his two seminal works —
the 1936 and 1950 papers—and his investigations in this regard have apparently laid 
the grounds from which computationalism developed. Be that as it may, it is, 
however, a different thing to say that Turing endorses or supports the view of 
computationalism.  
In his 1936 paper, “On computable numbers with an application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem,” Turing clarifies the notion of computation or computability 
as a way of responding to a foundational problem in mathematics posed by the great 
mathematician David Hilbert. Hilbert’s problem, which has come to be known as the 
decision problem , asks whether there is an effective or mechanical procedure by 
means of which we can determine whether or not any given mathematical problem is 
solvable (or whether any given mathematical function is computable). Turing’s 
ingenious strategy is to clarify the concept of computation not in the context of 
“human computers” (i.e., humans doing computations) but in the context of 
“computing machines” (i.e., machines doing computations). In this way, the 
scientifically intractable psychological considerations—mainly referring to the 
subjective qualities of conscious states—are put aside; and thus the investigation 
becomes a purely objective and mechanical undertaking.  
In the course of specifying the basic features that a machine must have, as well 
as the basic operations that it must be capable of performing, in order to perform 
computations and thus be regarded as computing, Turing conceives of an abstract 
computing machine which has come to be known as the Turing machine.  The Turing 
machine specifies the basic features of any possible computing machine; and for this 
reason, it serves as the theoretical forerunner of the modern digital computer. It 
becomes, as it were, the blueprint for constructing actual computers. Consequently, 
with his concept of the Turing machine, Turing then defines computation or 
computability in terms of the actions of a Turing machine. Accordingly, a 
computation is whatever can be implemented in a Turing machine; and corollary to 
this, a mathematical function is computable (or a mathematical problem is solvable) 
if such a function can be implemented in a Turing machine. This way of defining 
computation and computability has eventually come to be known as the Church-
Turing Thesis, after the logician Alonzo Church (1937, 42-43) has recognized the 
superior intelligibility of the Turing machine as a scheme for defi ning computability 
over other similar schemes.  Such other schemes included Church’s own, namely the 
lambda calculus, while another was Emil Post’s (see Penrose 1994, 20 -21).  And the 
said result of the schemes was a negative response to Hilbert’s problem:  that there is 
no effective or mechanical procedure by which one can determine the computability 
of any given mathematical function. Furthermore, Turing’s scheme, presumably  <54) 
because of its superior intelligibility, also became the basis of the ordinary 
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conception of computation as an “effective procedure” or as a finite set of step -by-
step procedures to arrive at a desired result (see Tim Crane 1995, 88).  
Now, in light of the Church-Turing Thesis, to say that thinking is a species of 
computing is to say that thinking is an operation of a Turing machine, for anything 
that is a species of computing is an operation of a Turing machine. This was the basis 
of Putnam when he remarked, in the course of advancing his machine functionalism 
[(which was a precursor of  computationalism (see Mabaquiao 2012, 32-35)]—that 
“human minds are instantiations of Turing machines” (see Putnam 1991, 199 -200). 
Saying that human minds are instantiations of Turing machines is, of course, just 
another way of saying that human minds are  computers. But all this would follow 
only if we grant, at the beginning, that thinking is indeed a species of computing. But 
Turing’s 1936 paper has nothing to say about the nature of thinking. What will follow 
from Turing’s ideas in this paper is that whenever we perform computations what we 
do are explainable in terms of the operations of a Turing machine, and not that 
whenever we think we perform computations. In the case of humans, computing, of 
course, is a kind of thinking, but this does not imply th at computing is all there is to 
human thinking. We can say, in this regard, that computing is a species of thinking, 
but not the other way around—that thinking is a species of computing.   
In sum, Turing’s 1936 paper, in the course of answering Hilbert’s f oundational 
question about mathematics, clarified the meaning of computation (and 
computability) and in the process contributed to the development of the computer. 
Turing’s clarification of the concept of computation, however, was never intended by 
Turing to describe the nature or essence of human thinking and to advance the view 
that thinking is a species of computing. The claim that the human mind is an 
instantiation of a Turing machine already grants such a view.  
 
ATTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE  
 
In his 1950 paper,  Turing tackles another problem still related to computing but 
this time on the question of whether computing machines can be considered 
intelligent. And the manner by which he tackles this problem, through an imitation 
game now famously known as the Turing test, paves the way for the development of 
AI as a discipline (as a branch of computer science that studies the nature of 
intelligence with the objective of constructing intelligent machines). It is said that 
some early AI programs, such as Joseph Weizenbaum’s ELIZA created in 1966 and 
Kenneth Colby’s PARRY created in 1972, were made with the objective of passing 
the Turing test. If Turing’s 1936 paper is a landmark in the history of digital 
computers and computer science, his 1950 paper is a landmark in the history of AI. 
As Herbert Simon and Craig Kaplan (1990, 2) write: “Since at least 1950 [we might 
take Turing’s (1950) essay  as a convenient starting point] that branch of computer 
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science called ‘artificial intelligence’ has been studying the  intelligence exhibited by 
machines” (see also French 2000,  215 -16).  
The question in his 1950 paper is whether computing machines is intelligent, and 
not whether human intelligence or intelligence in general is computational. But could 
a test for machine intelligence not also serve as a test for the computationality of 
intelligence? To properly deal with this question, we need to examine Turing’s 
conception of intelligence as assumed in his test and how such a conception of 
intelligence correlates with the <55) computationalist own conception. But first let 
us examine our commonsense notions of intelligence.    
 
Two views on the nature of intelligence  
 
We normally believe that human intelligence has both functional and conscious 
aspects. Its functional aspect generally consists in the ability to perform certain 
functions or to carry out certain tasks, which include answering questions, following 
rules, and solving problems. It is in light of this aspect that we say, for instance, that 
a student is intelligent in the area of mathematics if he or she can actually solve 
mathematical problems or perform mathematical operations.  Its conscious aspect, on 
the other hand, generally consists in the experience of certain mental states and 
processes, such as understanding and reasoning, as one performs certain functions or 
carries out certain tasks. And it is in light of this aspect that we say, for instance, that 
someone who gives the correct answer to a certain problem but does not understand 
how such an answer is arrived at is not really intelligent or does not really perform 
an intelligent action.  
The kind of intelligence assumed in computationalism, however, is a general one 
in that it concerns both humans and machines. What is said to be a species of 
computing is intelligence not just as it is possessed by humans but as it can possibly 
be possessed by machines as well. The question that arises here is whether 
intelligence, understood in this sense, should also be construed as having both 
functional and conscious features. Machines can obviously share the functional aspect 
of human intelligence; it is, however, quite contentious whether they can also share 
the conscious aspect of human intelligence. Be that as it may, the fundamentality of 
the conscious aspect of intelligence is here put into question. And consequently, the 
question that we need to contend with is: Is functionality sufficient to define the 
nature of intelligence?  
I shall call the affirmative reply to this question the purely functional view,  while 
the negative reply the conscious view . The purely functional view thus states that 
functionality is adequate to explain the nature of intelligence, while the conscious 
view states otherwise. For the purely functional view, an entity is intelligent if it has 
the required functionality regardless of whether or not such an entity is conscious; 
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but for the conscious view, such an entity can only be intelligent if, in addition to 
having the required functionality, it is also conscious. The “conscious view” should 
not be confused with what can be called the “purely conscious view.” The purely 
conscious view states that consciousness adequately defines the nature of 
intelligence, but the conscious view only asserts that consciousness is as fundamental 
as functionality in defining the nature of intelligence. The purely conscious view can 
be attributed to the idealists (who regard reality as fundamentally mental or spiritual) 
and substance dualists (who regard mental reality as independent of physical reality). 
While this view may have been influential in the past, it is, however, no longer in 
contention in contemporary philosophy of mind where the main motivation is the 
naturalization of the mind. Consequently, we shall limit our discussion to the purely 
functional and conscious views.     
Most of the strong advocates of the purely functional view are AI scientists who 
subscribe to computationalism. AI pioneers Simon and Newell, for instance, clearly 
assume this view in their physical symbol system hypothesis , which regards 
intelligence only in terms of action and behavior. In their  award -winning essay, <56) 
“Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search,” they (1976, 116) 
explain that “[a] physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for 
general intelligent action,” and by “general intelligent action,” they  “indicate the 
same scope of intelligence as we see in human action: that in any real situation 
behavior appropriate to the ends of the system and adaptive to the demands of the 
environment can occur, within some limits of speed and complexity.” Simon (1989, 
1-2), along with another fellow AI scientist, Kaplan, in another essay, “Foundations 
of cognitive science,” further states that “people are behaving intelligently when they 
choose courses of action that are relevant to achieving their goals, when they reply 
coherently and appropriately to questions that are put to them, when they solve 
problems of lesser or greater difficulty, or when they create or design something 
useful or beautiful or novel…”  It is, however, Roger Schank and Peter Childers (1984, 
51), in their book The cognitive computer , who may have provided the most direct 
expression of the purely functional view; thus: “When we ask What is intelligence? 
we are really only asking What does an entity, human or machine, have to do or say 
for us to call it intelligent?”   
On the other hand, most proponents of the conscious view are critics of 
computationalism, such as Penrose and Searle. Perhaps the clearest expressions of 
the conscious view come from the highly accomplished mathematician and physicist 
Penrose. In his book, The emperor’s new mind: Concerning computers, minds, and 
the laws of physics , Penrose (1989, 525-26) writes: 
 
There is also the question of what one means by the term ‘intelligence’. 
This, after all, is what the AI people are concerned with, rather than the 
perhaps more nebulous issue of ‘consciousness’…. In my own way of 
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looking at things, the question of intelligence is a subsidiary one to that of 
consciousness. I do not think that I would believe that true intelligence could 
be actually present unless accompanied by consciousness.  
 
In his other book, Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of 
consciousness, Penrose (1994, 38-39) argues that one cannot talk of intelligence and 
not talk of consciousness at the same time. For according to Penrose, if “(a) 
‘intelligence’ requires ‘understanding’ and (b) ‘understanding’ requires  
‘awareness’,” then intel ligence requires awareness. Thus, for Penrose, to say that 
something can be intelligent without being conscious in some way is to misuse the 
word “intelligence” or to deviate from its original meaning.  
Searle generally shares with Penrose’s view of intell igence. Searle, however, is 
more specific in explaining that there is only understanding, and hence intelligence, 
if there is awareness of what our mental states represent in the world. The 
intentionality or directedness of our mental states (the cognitive  or intentional ones) 
necessarily requires awareness of the objects or states of affairs that these mental 
states are about. Searle (1980) thus contends in his Chinese Room argument that 
machines can never be genuinely intelligent since they can never have  an awareness 
of what the symbols that they manipulate refer to in the world. These machines 
individuate and manipulate these symbols simply on the basis of their syntax and not 
of their semantics as well. <57) 
 
Intelligence and the Turing test  
 
Turing begins his 1950 paper by exploring how the question “Can machines 
think?” can best be dealt with. One usual strategy is to define the key terms involved 
in the question, namely “machine” and “think.” But as definitions should reflect the 
various ordinary usages of the terms being defined, this strategy will just turn the 
question (“Can machines think?”) as something that is answerable via a statistical 
survey, which Turing finds absurd. Turing then proposes a strategy where the original 
formulation of the question is to be replaced with one that is closely related to the 
original formulation but which avoids its possible ambiguities. Turing’s proposed 
reformulation of the question involves what he calls an “imitation game,” which we 
now know as the Turing test. The test basically determines whether a machine can 
successfully imitate the intelligent behavior of a human to deserve the attribution of 
intelligence. The main idea is that if the human is regarded as intelligent in virtue of 
his or her behavior, then a machine exhibiting the same behavior should, by force of 
consistency, be regarded as intelligent as well.  
One simplified version of this test is as follows. Imagine a human interrogator 
communicating with two respondents: one is human while the other is a ma chine. A 
wall physically separates the interrogator and the two respondents; and the 
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interrogator communicates with the respondents only through text messages using 
computers. Let us say that there are two computer terminals, one for each respondent; 
and the interrogator, though he knows that he is communicating with a human and a 
machine, does not know in which terminal he is communicating with the human and 
with the machine. According to the test, if after a series of questions and answers the 
interrogator could not tell solely on the basis of the respondents’ answers which of 
these respondents is the human and which is the machine, the machine is said to have 
passed the test, and is consequently considered to be intelligent.  
Is Turing through his test proposing a definition of intelligence? A widely held 
view is that he is, and the type of definition  he is proposing is an operational one 
wherein intelligence is defined in terms of performing certain tasks or activities —
which is nothing but what we have called the purely functional view of intelligence. 
Robert French (2000, 116), for instance, in his article “The Turing test: the first 50 
years,”  writes that one of the seminal contributions of Turing was that “he provided 
an elegant operational definition of thinking that, in many ways, set the entire field 
of artificial intelligence (AI) in motion.” Some scholars, however, dispute this  view. 
Preeminent Turing scholar Jack Copeland (2000, 522), for instance, writes: “Twenty -
five years later, the lesson has still not been learned that there is no definition to be 
found in Turing’s paper of 1950. Commentator after commentator states that T uring’s 
intention was to offer a definition of ‘thinking’ or ‘intelligence’.”  
Copeland and others who share his view make a valid point here. There is a big 
difference between saying that functionality is the basis for intelligence attribution 
and saying that functionality is all there is to intelligence. There is in fact no logical 
inconsistency in holding that functionality is the only basis for intelligence 
attribution while maintaining that consciousness is also essential for intelligence. 
Turing is just concerned with intelligence attribution; he is not after a definition of 
intelligence. This is in fact clearly expressed by Turing (1950, 433) himself at the 
very beginning of his 1950 essay: <58) 
 
I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’ This should 
begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms “machine” and 
“think”…Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question 
by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively 
unambiguous words.  
  
Based on these remarks, Turing will simply be contradicting himself if he intends 
his replacement of the said question by another one as a way of offering a certain 
definition of intelligence. But is it not the case that the attribution of intelligence 
somehow presupposes a certain definition of intelligence? Yes, but the specification 
of such a definition is not necessary to settle the issue of whether intelligence can 
legitimately be attributed to machines. The point can perhaps be simply put as 
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follows: Regardless of what we really or ultimately mean by intelligence there are 
undoubtedly some concrete ways by means of which we attribute intelligence to our 
fellow humans. The activity of answering questions must surely be one of these ways. 
What Turing simply does is to make this particular activity, with some modifications, 
as a test to determine whether intelligence can be legitimately attributed to machines.   
Turing’s reply (1950, 445-47) to the Argument from Consciousness further sheds 
light on this point—that he is not after a definition of intelligence. The argument 
maintains that intelligence can be attributed to machines only if machines can have 
conscious states such as emotions and sensations. Turing’s reply is that we have no 
way of knowing whether machines are conscious or not when exhibiting intelligent 
behaviors, but this is no different from the fact that we also have no way of knowing 
whether other persons have conscious states when exhibiting intelligent behaviors. 
Turing further notes that if consciousness will be used as the criterion for intelligence 
attribution the result is the absurd position of solipsism (the view that only I, the 
speaker, have conscious states and thus the only intelligent being in the world). 
Turing, however, qualifies that  he does not deny the mysteries about consciousness; 
what he rather thinks is that such mysteries have nothing to do with the attribution of 
intelligence to machines. Turing (1950, 447) continues:  
 
This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of ou r test. According 
to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be 
sure that machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking… 
In short then, I think that most of those who support the argument from 
consciousness could be persuaded to abandon it rather than be forced into 
the solipsist position. They will then probably be willing to accept our test. 
I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about 
consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with 
any attempt to localise it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need 
to be solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned 
in this paper. 
 
Now, if Turing were concerned with defining intelligence he would have 
acknowledged the need to deal with the nature, or mystery, of consciousness whose 
reality he obviously does not deny. As Turing is not offering any definition of 
intelligence, it is safe to conclude that it does not really matter to him whether 
intelligence is defined in purely functional terms or in terms of consciousness as well. 
The most that can be said here is that his test advances a functional criterion for 
intelligence attribution, which does not necessarily imply or assume a pure ly 
functional definition of intelligence.  <59) 
Furthermore, the Turing test, on closer inspection, is not a test for intelligence 
exclusive to computing machines. And if so, the computational nature of the machine 
that passes the test has nothing to do with the  attribution of intelligence to it. This 
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point is actually emphasized by Turing himself when he replies to one of the 
objections that he tackles in his 1950 paper, namely, the Argument from Continuity 
in the Nervous System. According to this objection, sin ce the nervous system is not 
a discrete system while the computer is, then there cannot be a computer simulation 
of the nervous system. To this objection Turing (1950, 451) replies: “It is true that a 
discrete-state machine must be different from a continuous machine. But if we adhere 
to the conditions of the imitation game, the interrogator will not be able to take any 
advantage of this difference.” Simply, the point of Turing is that the said objection 
is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Turing drives the  point home when he clarifies that 
the computational nature of the computer is irrelevant to the attribution of 
intelligence to it since it is possible to conceive of another machine (e.g., the 
“differential analyser”) that works differently from a compute r but can likewise pass 
the test. Turing (1950, 451-52) writes: 
  
The situation can be made clearer if we consider some other simpler 
continuous machine. A differential analyser will do very well. (A differential 
analyser is a certain kind of machine not o f the discrete-state type used for 
some kinds of calculation.)...It would not be possible for a digital computer 
to predict exactly what answers the differential analyser would give to a 
problem, but it would be quite capable of giving the right sort of 
answer...Under these circumstances it would be very difficult for the 
interrogator to distinguish the differential analyser from the digital 
computer.  
  
Finally, some scholars (see Whitby 1996, and Ford and Hayes 2002) have pointed 
out that while the Turing test did provide the impetus for researches in AI, such a test 
is no longer relevant and will even be an obstacle to the future development of AI. 
More particularly, while the project of constructing machine intelligence did start out 
by pursuing machine imitation of human intelligence, such a project, according to 
these scholars, would have to transcend, if not abandon, such a pursuit if it were to 
make real progress. The analogy used was mechanical flight: the construction of 
flying machines was inspired by bird flight and started out by imitating how birds fly 
(like the flapping of wings), but real progress came when some early designers of 
these machines (the Wright brothers) started thinking of how machines would be able 
to fly without imitating how birds fly.  
I think this is a very important insight and it indirectly supports our own thoughts 
about the Turing test. Based on the given analogy, what will make this test irrelevant 
and an obstacle to the AI project will be the requirement that for machines to be truly 
intelligent they should be intelligent in exactly the same way that humans are 
intelligent. But the Turing test has no such requirement. As we have shown, it is 
enough for Turing that machines imitate the functionality of human intelligence to 
deserve the ascription of intelligence. And how such functionality is made possible 
14 
 
by some inner processes, be they of the conscious, computational, or 
noncomputational type, is simply irrelevant for such an ascription. The Turing test 
that these scholars talk about can only refer, therefore, to a certain conception of this 
test which we have precisely put into question: that this test endorses a certa in theory 
of mind (or definition of intelligence) which some scholars have taken to be that of 




Being widely regarded as the father of computer technology, Turing’s 
contributions to the development of this technology are wel l placed. It is, however, 
contentious whether Turing subscribed to the theory of mind inspired by this 
technology—computationalism. I have shown that while Turing greatly contributed 
to the clarification of the two key concepts that define the theses of computationalism, 
namely, the concepts of computation and intelligence , his investigations on these 
concepts were not intended to establish, nor did they support, the view that regards 
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